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"WHY HAVE A FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM?"
Elizabeth Warrent
I begin with an empirical observation: Businesses fail. Most busi-
nesses meet all their outstanding obligations and still turn a profit.
But some do not. This talk is about the law of business failure.
I may be speaking to a room full of lawyers, I suspect that I am
not speaking to a group of people trained to think about business
failure. For most of you, the entire law school experience-with the
exception of your course in bankruptcy-consisted of two questions:
examination of the scope of a party's rights, and determination of
how much another party owes if those rights have been infringed.
In practice, however, I suspect that most of you have noticed that
the problem with which attorneys frequently deal is not whether the
rights exist or the scope of the outstanding obligation, but instead
whether the debtor can or will pay what is owed. The law of failure
deals with the central questions of how much we will force a debtor
to repay and to whom those debts will be repaid.
There will always be business failures because we deal in a capi-
talist market that incorporates risk as a central feature. This means
that we must have some way to deal with the failures that sometimes
follow those risks. This means we must have a bankruptcy system.
We may not want to call it a bankruptcy system; I don't really care
what we call it. We could .call it cucumber if that would make it
more palatable. But the reality is that we must have a way to deal
with business failures.
Markets change. Some risks result in success; some in failure.
That is what risk assessment is all about. The question is: When
businesses fail, what happens to all of those outstanding obliga-
tions? During the period of failure, businesses still have assets and
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they continue to engage in transactions. The law must determine
what to do with all those obligations.
There are a wide range of options that might deal with failure.
First, we could simply let the debtor decide who gets paid. The
debtor could say, "I like you, so you'll get what I've got left. I'll pay
you off and not the others." The favored creditors would be
pleased, although the disfavored ones would be pretty unhappy.
Second, the creditors could find their own extra-legal way to deal
with loss distribution. Creditors could simply come to collect. And
the bigger creditors-the powerful, the quick, the frightening-
would likely collect more than the weak, slow, or cooperative credi-
tors. This puts a real premium on size and speed, but it creates an
effective distribution of the assets of a failing business.
Third, we could let the parties decide on a distribution pattern
by contract. Parties could say in advance, "We will contract for fail-
ure. If anything goes wrong, you promise you will pay me first."
And everyone says "Fine." Of course, there is a problem in that
debtors will tend to promise everyone that they are going to be paid
back first. But we could create some system to monitor that.
Fourth, we might choose simply to have an imposed priority sys-
tem-we could say that employees are going to get paid first, or that
trade creditors are going to get paid first or that people who helped
you purchase hard assets are going to get paid first. We could pick
any number of people to benefit from an imposed priority system.
State law provides one way to deal with collapse. In effect, it
picks the first three of the options set forth above. It lets the debtor
pick who will be paid, and it lets the most powerful creditors-those
who get in there first and get judgment liens-get paid first. State
law also allows for some distribution by contract, permitting credi-
tors to obtain security interests in certain assets.
The bankruptcy system chooses a number of ways to deal with
failure. It uses the fourth alternative by imposing some repayment
priorities. For example, bankruptcy law provides that taxing author-
ities will be paid ahead of most of the parties who did business with
the debtor. It says that employees will be paid ahead of many other
creditors. It also permits some contract ordering. Bankruptcy ac-
knowledges some prebankruptcy contracts in order to protect
postbankruptcy positions. It also mandates a pro rata distribution.
The question is: Why have a federal bankruptcy system? Why
not leave the problem to state law or to private, extra-legal collec-
tion? The justification for the existence of the federal bankruptcy
system is based on two premises. One is that a federal uniform sys-
tem, specifically designed to address collapse, is a rational way to
deal with failure. Bankruptcy is provided for in the Constitution.
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Consider how few aspects of commercial life were addressed in the
Constitution. And yet it provides that there shall be a uniform law
of bankruptcy.1 Why? Because failure was seen as a big problem,
and one that we do not want people escaping by moving from one
state to another. The race to the bottom as states pass laws to en-
courage corporations to do business locally in the context of corpo-
rate law has produced serious problems. Consider the implication if
the states determined what would happen to a multinational corpo-
ration once it decided to file for bankruptcy in Delaware, South Da-
kota, Oklahoma, or wherever. The ide is that the consequences of
failure ought to be the same no matter where it happens. Moreover,
a federal system can reduce total cost by providing nationwide ser-
vice of process, as well as full coverage of all debtors, creditors and
property in dispute. (I note parenthetically that we are now moving
toward an international law dealing with business failure. The
problems created because companies are free to move their assets
either into the United States, where they will be better protected, or
outside the United States, if they think they will be better protected
somewhere else, cause havoc when multinational companies fail.
But that is a separate problem for another day.)
The second premise of federal bankruptcy law is that these uni-
form laws should reduce the total loss imposed by the system. This
is why, for example, secured creditors cannot just pull the plug on a
faltering business. If a creditor has a security interest in a critical
machine, the fact that there may be going-concern value in this busi-
ness is irrelevant to the creditor, since it can sell the machine for
more than the outstanding value of its loan. If the creditor can sim-
ply back the truck up to the business doors, take the machine and
leave, then more loss is imposed on the creditor group as a whole.
But if the creditor is required to leave that machine in place for a
period of time and collect payments on it, other creditors will also
continue to profit from the earnings of the business, and total losses
will be reduced.
There is a third reason that we have the current bankruptcy sys-
tem. We have made the decision, right or wrong, to maintain a vol-
untary bankruptcy system. There are no Chapter 11 or Chapter 7
police of any kind. There is no one who comes along and says "We
investigated your reports and we think you're bankrupt. Shut this
business down." Instead, we let the private parties themselves make
that decision, including the decision to use Chapter 11. Because of
that, there is a necessary trade off. Judge Jones is exactly right
about what happens when a business decides to file for Chapter 11.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 4.
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Chances are good that it will be a death penalty for the business.
The business is giving up an enormous amount: it must reveal an
extensive amount of information about its operations. It is sub-
jected to a number of controls over its business operations. Its
managers may be subject to personal liability or criminal penalties
for some of their actions. So what incentive is there to go into bank-
ruptcy? It is the one shot the business has at survival when the alter-
native is that it will not survive at all. To encourage voluntary
participations-and voluntary shutdowns-we develop a system that
balances opportunities and risk for the debtor.
Is the bankruptcy system socialization of risk? No. My sense is
that the reason bank failures and bankruptcy are stitched together in
this panel is that the bankruptcy system is what happens when we do
not socialize the risk, and bank failure is what happens when we do.
There is no taxpayer back-up in bankruptcy; no FDIC or FSLIC to
make up losses in bankruptcy. Loss distribution in Chapter 11 oc-
curs among private parties. More to the point, in Chapter 11, there
is strong protection of the public fisc. Bankruptcy provides repay-
ment priority to the local, state and federal taxing authorities. 2
Moreover, Chapter 11 aims toward self-funding through the fees
collected and privatized representation.
Bankruptcy involves risk distribution among private parties.
But the risk that a debtor will fail, and that loan collection will be
accomplished through bankruptcy, is something that private parties
can certainly price. Anyone who determines the cost of a loan today
must consider the risks associated with collection, including the pos-
sibility that one of the parties involved will file bankruptcy and will
thereby establish certain rights. So long as the risks are clear in ad-
vance, private parties are able to adjust to them.
Is there abuse of the system? Undoubtedly. There is abuse in
any big, bureaucratic system. But is the abuse so widespread that
we would be better off moving to a different kind of bankruptcy sys-
tem? Consider the data. Business bankruptcy filings are up. In
1980, there were 8,000 business bankruptcy filings; in 1983, there
were 20,000; in 1986, 21,000; in 1988, down to 17,000; in 1990,
back up to 20,000.3 Ernst & Whinney did a study suggesting that
2 II U.S.C. § 507 (1988).
3 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS
544 (1981) rounded; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS 328 (1986) rounded; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 364 (1988) rounded; PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS reprinted in Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) No. 39, at
A8 (Sept. 26, 1991) rounded.
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filings are likely to stabilize somewhere in this range.4 The percent-
age of filings that are in Chapter 11, however, has taken a curious
drop. From 1983 to 1988, 5% of all bankruptcy filings were in
Chapter 11. In 1990, only 2.2% of bankruptcy filings were in Chap-
ter 11.5 The system has grown enormously (and has certainly grown
in its press coverage), but the proportion of bankruptcy filings that
are in Chapter 11 has become much smaller. Unfortunately, that is
not going to help Judge Jones or Judge Easterbrook much. Filings
per judge are up 66% in the last decade, and that means lots of
business for sitting judges, since the court system has not expanded
accordingly.6
Judge Jones is exactly right about the success of businesses in
Chapter 11. Nine out of ten fail; of those that are nominal suc-
cesses, probably a third are also liquidations. The true survival rate
is probably less than 5%. That means, in effect, that the people who
file Chapter 11 are not rich and wealthy companies that say, "Hah, I
found a way not to pay my debts." No one goes cheerfully to have
major surgery. No, the data suggest that these are businesses that
took a chance on the last thing that might help them survive, and
most found that in fact it did not because they were already dead.
There is very little that the bankruptcy system can do for certain
problems. It is a limited remedy. It can help a business that is able
to stay in place and refinance. It can help a business that needs to
sever a bad business part from a good business part. But Chapter
11 cannot turn around a depressed real estate market. It cannot
make a business productive. It cannot give a business a product that
everybody wants to buy. It can administer the business's liquida-
tion, which, in fact, is what it does most of the time.
The most difficult social problems get dumped into bank-
ruptcy-mass torts, environmental disasters, the dashed expecta-
tions of retired employees. (I should note here that is going to be
the next big problem. We bought labor peace in the 1970s and 80s
by promising those employees that they were going to have retire-
ments like you would not believe. Well, you know what? They
should not have believed because there is not enough money to pay
off on many of those promises. The LTV bankruptcy raises a fright-
ening specter of future pension cases.)
4 ERNST & WHINNEY, REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS
ON BANKRUPTCY FINANCIAL INFORMATION 5 (May 1989).
5 ABI Briefs Press on Bankruptcy Statistics and Fees Survey, ABI NEWSLETTER No. 4, at 8
(June 1991); and calculation from sources in note 3 supra.
6 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY STATISTICAL INFORMA-
TION 5 (April 1990).
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It hurts not to be paid. I do not like it any more than anyone
else does. It makes me very angry. There are losses in bankruptcy
to be distributed; that is what bankruptcy is about. And we blame
the bankruptcy system for distributing those losses. But failure
caused the loss; bankruptcy is only the means of distributing it. If
we are really talking about responsibility and socialization here, the
bankruptcy system is something for which we should be grateful.
Bankruptcy is what keeps private losses private and helps prevent
the shifting of those losses in a genuinely socialized way.
One case provides a good illustration of the consequences of a
weak bankruptcy system. In the late 1970s, Chrysler announced
that it was tottering on the brink of financial collaspe. At the time of
this announcement, the Bankruptcy Code was in transition between
the 1898 Act and the 1978 Code. There was a lot of dissatisfaction
with the old bankruptcy system, and no one believed the system was
strong enough to handle a big bankruptcy. Everyone turned to
Congress. The banks, the insurance companies, the pension funds,
and the unions all pressured their congressmen to help Chrysler
out. And the government said, "Okay, we'll provide loan guaran-
tees." It helped Chrysler because of the fear that if it didn't, the
consequences might be economically untenable. More to the point,
Congress was sure that the consequences of letting Chrysler fail
would be politically untenable.
Eventually we became more experienced with Chapter 11.
When Johns-Manville got into trouble a few years later, the com-
pany went to Congress and said, "Help us out." The victims went
to Congress and said, "Help us out." Then Eastern got into trouble
and said, "Help us out." Continental Airlines and Braniff Airlines
said, "Help us out." Even Wickes Lumber wanted help. But by
then the answer was "No." That is what Chapter 11 is there for.
The creditors and the debtors must work out their problems pri-
vately. A viable bankruptcy system sends a message to disputing
debtors and creditors: "Work it out. You got into this arrangement
without the government's help. You will deal with the losses, dis-
tribute the assets through Chapter 11, and survive collapse without
its help."
Chapter 11 does not work perfectly. But given the job it has to
do, it is critical to keep the system very much intact.
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